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Abstract
Neural networks are one of the most investigated
and widely used techniques in Machine Learning.
In spite of their success, they still find limited ap-
plication in safety- and security-related contexts,
wherein assurance about networks’ performances
must be provided. In the recent past, automated
reasoning techniques have been proposed by sev-
eral researchers to close the gap between neural
networks and applications requiring formal guar-
antees about their behavior. In this work, we pro-
pose a primer of such techniques and a comprehen-
sive categorization of existing approaches for the
automated verification of neural networks. A dis-
cussion about current limitations and directions for
future investigation is provided to foster research
on this topic at the crossroads of Machine Learning
and Automated Reasoning.
1 Introduction
Neural Networks (NNs) are powerful learning models
that can achieve impressive results in many applica-
tions, such as image classification [Taigman et al., 2014]
or speech recognition [Yu et al., 2012], with some archi-
tectures even claimed to be matching the cognitive abil-
ities of humans [LeCun et al., 2015]. In spite of some
exceptions — see, e.g., [Jorgensen, 1997] and more re-
cently [Bojarski et al., 2016; Julian et al., 2016] — tradi-
tional applications of NNs have been mostly confined to sys-
tems without safety or security requirements, due to the ab-
sence of effective methods to guarantee the correct behavior
of such models.
There has long been an interest in the rigorous ver-
ification of NNs, with first attempts made in the early
2000s [Zakrzewski, 2001; Pullum et al., 2007], mostly mo-
tivated by applications in avionic systems. This line of re-
search was recently refueled by critical discoveries made
in [Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015]: machine
learning models, including state-of-the-art Deep Neural Net-
works (DNNs), can be unstable with respect to adversarial
perturbations. Such perturbations represent minimal changes
to correctly classified input data that can cause a network to
respond in unexpected and incorrect ways. These discover-
ies confirmed the worthiness of efforts to develop techniques
to provide guarantees about the behavior of NNs and other
learning models.
Among potential approaches to ensure correct behavior
of NNs, those based on Automated Reasoning show some
promise. Since NNs are complex implements, it is un-
likely that their performances can be checked and cor-
rected manually. Techniques such as Adversarial Train-
ing [Goodfellow et al., 2015] have been proposed with the
intent to steer learning in the direction of making resulting
networks more robust to adversarial attacks. However, re-
cent results [Carlini and Wagner, 2017] have shown that ex-
isting methods still lack thorough evaluations and often they
are even unable to detect adversarial examples. On the other
hand, automated reasoning tools can be applied to NNs “out
of the box” to perform verification of desired properties, e.g.,
robustness, safety, and equivalence. As with any algorith-
mic technique, the challenge shifts towards the computational
needs of automated verification, and the problem of scaling to
networks of relevant size arises.
Starting from the seminal contribution
of [Pulina and Tacchella, 2010], verification of NNs is
not just a theoretical possibility, but it has witnessed di-
verse proposals based on a variety of automated reasoning
techniques, including Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers,
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers and Mixed
Integer Programming (MIP) solvers. The contributions to be
found in the literature consider verification of diverse models,
from conventional NNs, to networks apt for representation
learning, i.e., those “...allowing a machine to be fed with
raw data and automatically discover the representations
needed for detection or classification” [LeCun et al., 2015].
Following the common usage found in the literature, we
associate the term deep to networks apt for representation
learning; by contrast, we use the term shallow to denote net-
works designed within a conventional learning framework.
As a matter of fact, while all NNs are arranged in layers of
elementary computation units, conventional networks are
indeed shallow since they rarely consist of several layers
beyond input and output ones. From the initial challenges
and limitations presented in [Pulina and Tacchella, 2012],
mostly related to the application of SMT solvers to prove
properties of shallow NNs, several contributions have fo-
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Figure 1: A simple network containing 3 input nodes, 2 output nodes
and 3 hidden layers containing 5 nodes each.
cused on the challenge of scaling SMT, as well as SAT and
MIP techniques to deep networks. In this work, we present a
survey of such literature, and we contribute a categorization
of existing approaches based on properties and networks. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work attempting to
put in perspective this body of work within the communities
of Machine Learning and Automated Reasoning. Our
contribution supports comparative assessments among appli-
cations, but it also helps in identifying open directions for
future research. With the categorization herewith proposed,
we hope to lay the foundations for further innovation in this
interdisciplinary domain.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we briefly introduce basic terms and definitions about
NNs; in Section 3 we provide a short introduction to the main
automated reasoning techniques that have been considered so
far to verify NNs. Section 4 provides a classification of the
current relevant literature and Section 5 describes the current
challenges and provides some potential directions for future
research.
2 Feed-forward Neural Networks
This survey will focus on approaches developed for the ver-
ification of feed-forward NNs. In such networks, neurons
are arranged in disjoint layers, with each layer being fully
connected with the next one, but without connection between
neurons in the same layer. We call a layer without incoming
connections input layer, a layer without outgoing connections
output layer, while all other layers are referred to as hidden
layers. Connections between neurons in the network are la-
beled with weights which can take, in the most general case,
real values1. Furthermore, each neuron is characterized by an
activation function defining the input-output relation for that
particular neuron. A pictorial representation of the architec-
ture described can be see in Fig. 1.
At a high level, these networks can be seen as func-
tions ν : In → Om, mapping an n-dimensional input do-
main In (n > 0) to a m-dimensional output domain Om
(m > 0). We argue that this representation captures most
1We do not discuss here how NNs are learned. Frameworks such
as Keras [Chollet and others, 2015] provide ready-to-use solutions
for learning networks from data.
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Figure 2: Examples of commonly used activation functions, assum-
ing that input weights are fixed to one.
cases of practical interest. For instance, a network com-
puting an approximation of some function f : Rn → R
would have I = O = R, whereas a network classifying
8-bit images of size h × v in two classes would be defined
as ν : {0, . . . , 255}h·v → {0, 1} with I = {0, . . . , 255} and
O = {0, 1}. The mapping is performed by feeding an input
e ∈ In to the network through its input layer, which is then
propagated to the output layer by successively computing lin-
ear combinations of values from nodes in the preceding layer
and applying activation functions to the result. Several types
of activations exist, each of them having different properties
which determine the expressive power of the network. Most
commonly used activation functions include, e.g., logistic sig-
moid, hyperbolic tangent and rectified linear units (ReLU) –
see Fig. 2.
3 Decision procedures
Several approaches have been proposed to verify different
classes of networks. Even though such approaches might dif-
fer in several aspects, they all tackle the verification problem
by encoding networks to constraint systems. In this section
we briefly introduce the decision procedures that have been
most commonly used to solve constraint systems encoding
neural networks. For further details we refer the interested
reader to [Biere et al., 2009] and [Schrijver, 1999].
SAT SAT solving aims to check the satisfiability of a propo-
sitional logic formulaϕ represented as Boolean combinations
of atomic (Boolean) propositions. Although several algo-
rithms have been proposed to solve the boolean satisfiability
problem, here we introduce CDCL-style SAT solving algo-
rithm (see Fig. 3), being the most commonly implemented in
state-of-the-art SAT solvers.
The CDCL algorithm proceeds as follows. Starting from
an input CNF formula, the algorithm explores the search
space by iteratively making decisions, i.e., it assigns truth
values to some heuristically chosen propositions. After
each such decision, the algorithm applies Boolean Constraint
Propagation (BCP) to determine further variable assignments
that are implied by the last decision. If BCP leads to a con-
flict, i.e., if the value of a proposition is implied to be true as
well as false at the same time, conflict-driven clause-learning
and non-chronological backtracking are applied: the algo-
rithm follows back the chain of implications and applies res-
olution to derive a reason for the conflict in form of a conflict
clause, which is added to the solver’s clause set. Backtrack-
ing removes previous decisions and their implications until
the conflict clause can be satisfied.
If the input has clauses consisting of a single literal, these
literals will be directly assigned. Therefore, the algorithm
starts with BCP to detect implications. If BCP leads to a con-
flict, the algorithm tries to resolve the conflict. If the conflict
cannot be resolved, the input formula is unsatisfiable. Oth-
erwise, if the conflict is successfully resolved, the algorithm
backtracks and continues with BCP. If BCP can be completed
without any conflicts, a new decision is made if there are any
unassigned propositions. Otherwise, a satisfying solution is
found.
SMT Satisfiability Modulo Theories is the problem of de-
ciding the satisfiability of a first-order formula with respect to
some decidable theory T . In particular, SMT generalizes the
boolean satisfiability problem (SAT) by adding background
theories such as the theory of real numbers, the theory of in-
tegers, and the theories of data structures (e.g., lists, arrays
and bit vectors).
To decide the satisfiability of an input formula ϕ in CNF,
SMT solvers (see Fig. 4) typically first build a Boolean ab-
straction abs(ϕ) of ϕ by replacing each constraint by a fresh
Boolean variable (proposition), e.g.,
ϕ : x ≥ y ∧ ( y > 0 ∨ x > 0 ) ∧ y ≤ 0
abs(ϕ) : A ∧ ( B ∨ C ) ∧ ¬B
where x and y are real-valued variables, and A, B and C are
propositions.
A SAT solver searches for a satisfying assignment S for
abs(ϕ), e.g., S(A) = 1, S(B) = 0, S(C) = 1 for the
above example. If no such assignment exists then the in-
put formula ϕ is unsatisfiable. Otherwise, the consistency
of the assignment in the underlying theory is checked by a
theory solver. In our example, we check whether the set
{x ≥ y, y ≤ 0, x > 0} of linear inequalities is feasible,
which is the case. If the constraints are consistent then a
satisfying solution (model) is found for ϕ. Otherwise, the
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Figure 3: The CDCL framework.
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Figure 4: The SMT solving framework.
theory solver returns a theory lemma ϕE giving an explana-
tion for the conflict, e.g., the negated conjunction some in-
consistent input constraints. The explanation is used to refine
the Boolean abstraction abs(ϕ) to abs(ϕ) ∧ abs(ϕE). These
steps are iteratively executed until either a theory-consistent
Boolean assignment is found, or no more Boolean satisfying
assignments exist.
MIP Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MIP) solves lin-
ear problems over a set of integer and real valued variables.
MIP contains a set of decision variables, a set of linear con-
straints over these variables and an objective function to be
optimized (minimized or maximized) that is linear in decision
variables. Without loss of generality we consider a minimiza-
tion formulation of a MIP and assume that all variables are
integers that take values in a given interval. Let x1, . . . , xn
be a set of decision variables, an integer linear program can
be written as
min
∑
i=1
cixi
subject to
∑
i=1
ajixi ≥ bj , j ∈ [1,m]
xi ∈ [ai, bi] ∩ Z, i ∈ [1, n]
Values ci, aij and bj are constants that are specified during
problem formulation. One general approach to solving MIPs
is by using the branch-and-cutmethod that employs branch-
and-bound and cutting planes techniques. The branch-and-
bound method performs two main steps. First, it solves a
linear relaxation of MIP where all integrality constraints are
relaxed. In other words, we assume that all integer variables
can take real values. The cost of a solution of the relaxed
problem gives a lower bound on the optimal solution of the
original problem. However, this solution can contain frac-
tional values. Therefore, the MIP solver has to branch on
one of variables with the fractional value, splitting the search
space into two parts. For example, if x2 = 0.5 in a solution
then the split is x2 = 0 or x2 = 1. Based on these deci-
sion points, the search procedure builds a branching tree and
stores the best solution found in each node. These solutions
are used to prune future branches. The cutting planes tech-
nique is used to cut off fractional solutions. These cutting
inequalities are learned during search and help to improve the
quality of Linear Programming relaxations.
4 State of the art: a bird’s eye view
To describe properties of NNs defined as ν : In → Om, let
pre(x) and post(y) be sorted first order logic formulas, with
x and y occurring as free variables of sort SI and SO, respec-
tively. Informally, SI is the input type and SO is the output
type required by the network thought as a function in some
programming language. We say that pre defines precondi-
tions on the input of a network, and post defines postcondi-
tions on its output. We consider interpretations that map sort
SI to the input domain I
n and sort SO to the output domain
Om. For instance, an interpretation in a network defined as
ν : R → {0, 1}, could map SI = real and SO = boolean
to corresponding domains R and {0, 1}. Interpretations map
variables x and y to values in the domains In and Om. We
write I(x → e) to denote that variable x is mapped to value
e ∈ In by interpretation I, and ϕI to denote the value of
expression ϕ under interpretation I. We also consider the
predicates “=”, “ 6=”, and “<” with the usual semantics.
Properties. To the extent of our knowledge, all the studies
published so far about automated verification of NNs, focused
on three kinds of properties:
• Invariance. For specific conditions pre and post, assert-
ing an invariance property for a network ν amounts to
state
∀x.∀y.(pre(x) ∧ y = ν(x)) =⇒ post(y) (1)
The goal of automated verification is to prove (1) or find
a counterexample, i.e., some value e ∈ In such that
(pre(x) ∧ ¬post(y)I(x→e,y→ν(e)) is true.
• Invertibility. For specific conditions pre and post, as-
serting an invertibility property for a network ν amounts
to state
∀y.∃x.(post(y) ∧ y = ν(x)) =⇒ pre(x) (2)
Proving invertibility might be less interesting than actu-
ally finding a specific realization, i.e., given an output
pattern p ∈ Om find an input pattern e ∈ In such that
(post(y) ∧ y = ν(x) ∧ pre(x))I(x→e,y→p) is true.
• Equivalence. While invariance and invertibility refer to
a single network, equivalence is a property involving two
networks ν and ν′. For specific conditions pre and post,
it is defined as
∀x.∀y.∀w( pre(x)∧
y = ν(x) ∧ post(y)∧
w = ν′(x) ∧ post(w)) =⇒ y = w
(3)
The property can be either proved as such or a coun-
terexample can be produced, i.e., some e ∈ In such that
(pre(x)∧
post(y) ∧ post(w) ∧ y 6= w)I(x→e,y→ν(e),w→ν
′(e))
is true. In contexts wherein strict equality might be in-
appropriate, we can replace the term y = w in (3) with
the term ||y − w|| < ǫ, assuming that || · ||I is a norm
over Om and ǫI ∈ Om is a a tolerance, i.e., a threshold
under which the response of the networks is considered
to be indistinguishable.
As stated in (1) to (3), the scope of the properties is global,
i.e., interpretations range over full domains In and Om. Re-
searchers have also considered local versions wherein inter-
pretations range over specific regions of the input and output
domains.
Literature. In Table 1 we have organized all the contribu-
tions found in the literature, wherein the techniques described
in Section 3 are utilized to prove properties about NNs. For
invariance, we have considered an additional classification
into global and local versions (first two columns of the Ta-
ble), whereas for invertibility and equivalence, we did not
make a distinction due to the limited number of references
available. In particular, [Ehlers, 2017] mentions a local flavor
of invertibility considering DNNs with ReLU and MaxPool
nodes, whereas [Korneev et al., 2018] considers a global fla-
vor of the same property in the context of binarized (deep)
NNs (BNNs). As for equivalence, we found only one contri-
bution about BNNs in [Narodytska et al., 2017].
The first paper to consider automated verification for
shallow networks is [Pulina and Tacchella, 2010]. In-
deed, some authors refer to [Zakrzewski, 2001] as the
first attempt to scrutinize NNs in order to give formal
guarantees about their performances. We must stress
here that while [Zakrzewski, 2001] put forth the first an-
alytical approach to verify network’s accuracy, it did
not consider algorithmic verification which, on the con-
trary, is the focus of [Pulina and Tacchella, 2010] and
the ensuing literature herewith considered. In particu-
lar, [Pulina and Tacchella, 2010] focused on a global invari-
ance condition for multi-input, single-output networks in-
volving non-linear activation functions, whereby given ν :
In → O, as long as the input e ∈ In is guaranteed to
range within some prescribed interval, then ν(e) ∈ [a, b] with
a, b ∈ O. Also for the first time, [Pulina and Tacchella, 2010]
deals with verification-triggered network repair, i.e., how
to modify network’s weights in order to meet the in-
variance condition. The initial contribution is extended
in [Pulina and Tacchella, 2012] to consider other invariance
conditions, including local invariance and global sensi-
tivity. The main limitation of these early attempts is
that the number of activations functions in the networks
is relatively small (in the order of tens), and the pro-
posed encoding hardly scales for the kind of (deep) net-
works considered nowadays in applications. Other at-
tempts at proving invariance properties of shallow NNs in-
clude [Scheibler et al., 2015] and [Cheng et al., 2017a]. The
former approach leverages SMT technology over non-linear
arithmetic — with essentially the same limitations exposed
in [Pulina and Tacchella, 2012] — whereas the latter consid-
ers MIP techniques.
More recently, due to the growing interest in DNNs, sev-
eral papers came out proposing approaches that, to some ex-
tent, can deal with networks having nodes in the order of
thousands, e.g., 1800 ReLU nodes in [Katz et al., 2017], and
millions of parameters, e.g., about 1.25 million parameters
in the CIFAR experiment considered in [Huang et al., 2017].
Most of the contributions proposed in the literature focus
Network Invariance Invertibility Equivalence
Local Global
BNN [Narodytska et al., 2017] [Cheng et al., 2017b] [Korneev et al., 2018] [Narodytska et al., 2017]
DNN(ReLU)
[Gopinath et al., 2017;
Katz et al., 2017;
Bastani et al., 2016]
[Katz et al., 2017;
Dutta et al., 2017;
Kuper et al., 2018]
— —
DNN(ReLU+Pooling)
[Ehlers, 2017;
Tjeng and Tedrake, 2017]
[Bunel et al., 2017;
Fischetti and Jo, 2017]
[Ehlers, 2017] —
DNN [Huang et al., 2017] — — —
NN
[Pulina and Tacchella, 2012;
Cheng et al., 2017a]
[Pulina and Tacchella, 2010;
Scheibler et al., 2015]
— —
Table 1: Literature classified by network type (rows) and properties considered (columns). For invariance properties, a further distinction
is made between papers dealing with local or global invariance. “BNN” row collects references dealing specifically with Binarized (deep)
NNs. Deep network references are organized according to the kind of nodes for which the techniques thereto proposed are applicable:
“DNN(ReLU)” for networks made up of ReLUs only, “DNN(ReLU+Pooling)” if also pooling nodes are considered, and “DNN” if no
restriction is placed on nodes. “NN “row collects references which, in principle, consider any kind of NN, but are mostly concerned with
shallow networks.
on invariance properties only and consider restrictions of
DNNs, i.e., they consider only some kind of activation func-
tion. ReLUs, possibly with MaxPool nodes, are by far the
most common target: to the best of our knowledge, the only
contribution dealing with convolutional, ReLU, max-pooling,
and softmax layers is [Huang et al., 2017], whose goal is
to verify (local) adversarial robustness using SMT tech-
nology black-box. Noticeably, [Tjeng and Tedrake, 2017;
Bastani et al., 2016] and [Fischetti and Jo, 2017] are the only
contributions using MIP encodings to prove adversarial ro-
bustness in a local and global fashion, respectively. Other
contributions instead consider variations of SMT technol-
ogy wherein the theory solver is specialized to deal with the
problem at hand. This is the case of [Gopinath et al., 2017;
Katz et al., 2017; Kuper et al., 2018] which consider Relu-
plex, a Simplex-based decision procedure specialized to
tackle constraints arising from the verification of deep net-
works comprised of ReLU nodes. Uniquely among other sur-
veyed works, [Gopinath et al., 2017] proposed a combination
between inductive and deductive techniques to improve scal-
ing on large networks: a global invariance check is reduced to
a series of local invariance check using clustering techniques
on the input space. In [Ehlers, 2017] networks made of Re-
LUs and MaxPool nodes are considered. Also in this case, an
original combination of SAT and a theory solver (an Integer
Linear Programming engine) is considered to enable verifica-
tion of a network containing 1341 nodes.
Overall, looking at Table 1, it is clear that existing literature
leaves a lot of potential areas of interest to be covered. Firstly,
full-fledged DNNs are considered only in one contribution,
namely [Huang et al., 2017], and the approach therewith pro-
posed is still in its prototypical stage. This is in stark contrast
with the development of tools for learning neural networks,
many of which are available off-the-shelf, reaching a substan-
tial degree of sophistication. Secondly, network equivalence
and invertibility remain mostly uncharted, but they could sup-
port effective application of neural networks in many ways.
For instance, showing that a small-footprint network is equiv-
alent to a large-footprint one, memory and energy could be
saved by running the smallest network. Also showing that a
given output pattern may not be produced by any input pat-
tern, could help debug networks that could otherwise reach
production based solely on empirical tests.
5 Challenges and perspectives
The first and foremost challenge in automated verification
of NNs, is to coordinate the efforts of two “separated at
birth” AI communities: Machine Learning and Automated
Reasoning. On one side, Machine Learning has made re-
markable progresses in the last decade, and it is now one of
the mainstream AI domains, backed by substantial funding
and success stories, e.g., Deepmind’s AlphaGo2, Facebook’s
DeepFace [Taigman et al., 2014], and Neurala’s3 Lifelong-
DNNTM, to cite only some. The existing need for expla-
nation and certification associated with learning algorithms
has been recognized by the community, e.g., by a number
of recent workshops dedicated to the topic 4 and DARPA re-
search programs 5. For NNs, most researchers in Machine
Learning agree that new techniques are needed to understand,
trust and manage networks that might be used in regulated
areas, such as law or medicine, or in safety- and security-
critical applications. As noted by Percy Liang during his in-
2
https://deepmind.com/blog/alphagos-next-move/.
3
https://www.neurala.com/press-releases/edge-deep-learning-without-cloud.
4
Explainable Artificial Intelligence at IJCAI 2017,
http://home.earthlink.net/˜dwaha/research/meetings/ijcai17-xai/
and Interpretable Machine Learning at NIPS 2017, http://interpretable.ml/
5
Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence
vited talk at AAAI 20186, current means to assess the qual-
ity of NNs focus on accuracy only, encouraging behaviors
that are good on average. This leaves out a number of im-
portant properties and creates vulnerabilities in NNs which
can be exploited, e.g., in cyber-attacks to AI systems. On
the other side, Automated Reasoning has made, possibly less
spectacular, but steady progresses as well. Automated rea-
soning tools provide staple techniques for hardware, soft-
ware and protocol verification in research as well as indus-
trial applications — see, e.g., [Harrison, 2009]. Researchers
expanded the reach beyond the traditional “comfort zone” of
discrete finite-state models to deal with cyber-physical sys-
tems incorporating continuous and stochastic dynamics —
see, e.g., [Clarke and Zuliani, 2011; Kumar et al., 2012]. On
top of this, the community has been actively providing in-
teresting contributions towards solving the problem of NN
verification as described in Section 4. Therefore, we believe
that it is worth to merge the two streams of research, by now
largely independent, in order to harness the power of auto-
mated verification whenever learning methods require (for-
mal) assurances related to their performances.
The second important challenge is to mate precision with
scalability. As shown, e.g., by [Pulina and Tacchella, 2012;
Scheibler et al., 2015], the main barrier to applying off-the-
shelf automated reasoning tools to analyze NNs is that
such tools hardly scale to deal with current state-of-the art
models: DNNs like AlexNet or GoogleLeNet feature mil-
lions of parameters, resulting in prohibitively large search
spaces for automated reasoning algorithms. This is why re-
searchers either restrict the scope of application of general-
purpose tools — see, e.g., [Huang et al., 2017] — or de-
velop special-purpose solvers — see, e.g., [Katz et al., 2017;
Ehlers, 2017]. Even if SAT and MIP techniques are known to
scale very well on problems of considerable size, researchers
using them also report limitations in dealing with networks
of moderate size given current demands. Noticeably, a lot
of research in the ML community has been carried out to
reduce the size of ML models that are known to be highly
redundant in terms of the number of parameters. Two ex-
amples of such techniques are model reduction and knowl-
edge distillation. Model reduction methods take an original
model and use, for example, quantization techniques to re-
duce its size while preserving accuracy. An extreme case of
such quantization is binarizing most parameters of the net-
work [Courbariaux et al., 2015; Hubara et al., 2016]. Simi-
larly, knowledge distillation algorithms start with a full net-
work and build a new smaller network without a signifi-
cant accuracy loss. Conversely, on the Automated Reason-
ing side, there is a need of effective tools. For instance, large
classes of NNs, e.g., NNs with ReLU activation functions,
can be encoded using linear arithmetic constraints enhanced
with simple logical constraints — an approach considered
by [Ehlers, 2017]; other examples of specialization include
the Reluplex algorithm that analyzes only NNs with ReLU
activation functions [Katz et al., 2017] and, as mentioned
in [Narodytska et al., 2017; Korneev et al., 2018], the usage
6
”How Should We Evaluate Machine Learning for AI?”,
https://aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI-18/invited-speakers/
of pseudo-Boolean constraints to encode binarized NNs in
order to leverage pseudo-Boolean solvers rather than a fully
fledged SMT solvers. Additionally, verification tools should
exploit structural properties of NNs, e.g., the layered graph
structure of the network, and the parameter sharing features
of convolutional layers. For example, abstraction techniques
or clever decompositions can be used to verify only critical
parts of the models — similarly to what [Huang et al., 2017]
proposed.
Overall, we believe that the synergy between Machine
Learning and Automated Reasoning communities can be very
fruitful. Automated verification of NNs could be the new
driving force for theoretical and practical advancements in
Automated Reasoning and, at the same time, ML could bene-
fit from powerful verification techniques to generate proofs of
correctness for NNs. Such techniques could even be used to
explain models, making them more amenable to application
in regulated contexts. Hybrid solutions could also be adopted,
where verification could be embedded into the learning pro-
cess, and learning could support effective verification. In the
following, we briefly outline some of the directions that can
be explored to improve on the current state of the art.
Common standards and APIs. Appropriate standards are
to be developed such that learning tools can be eas-
ily and interchangeably connected to verification ones.
APIs are required in cases where integration should be
tight: for instance in [Pulina and Tacchella, 2010], re-
pairing the NN required communication between verifi-
cation and learning engines to leverage counterexamples
and improve on learning.
Benchmark collections. Right now, most contributions
cited in Section 4 consider their own case studies
wherefore they provide specific results — with MNIST
database images being an exception. The creation and
the dissemination of a library of benchmarks —- re-
specting the standards defined above—will enable com-
munities to share challenges and measure progress.
Hybrid reasoning methods. It is unlikely that complex, im-
plements trained on dedicated hardware like modern
DNNs can be verified by general purpose automated rea-
soning tools and hardware. Developers of automated
reasoning techniques must realize this, and push inno-
vation towards tools that can deal with, e.g., non lineari-
ties, non-algebraic activation functions, and complex ar-
chitectures, possibly harnessing the power of the same
computing devices used to train NNs.
Transparent learning models. The tendency towards creat-
ing networks whose size and complexity makes them
hardly explainable should probably be reconsidered, at
least for networks whose safety or security must be
guaranteed in all expected working conditions. There-
fore, we need the ability to design and train networks
whose effectiveness is uncompromised, but whose ver-
ification is feasible. This is a goal that the Ma-
chine Learning community must acknowledge and con-
sider [Kuper et al., 2018].
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